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The globalization of product markets has intensified competition in an
increasingly wide array of industries, including automobiles, consumer electronics,
steel, and computer chips to name just a few. In manufacturing as a whole during
the last thirty years, productivity growth in the U.S. has lagged significantly behind
that of Japan, Germany, Sweden, and many other industrialized countries. For
example, between 1960 and 1985, the annual growth in manufacturing productivity
(output per hour) was 2.7 percent in the U.S. compared with 8.0 percent in Japan.
Unless this trend can be turned around, U.S. companies will find it increasingly
difficult to compete in the world market.1
Automation is one important factor in productivity and productivity growth.
In particular, organizations are increasingly turning to advanced manufacturing
technology (AMT) to enhance their ability to compete. AMT typically refers to
flexible manufacturing systems (FMS), computer numerical control (CNC) ,
computer aided design and computer aided manufacturing (CADCAM), and
computer integrated manufacturing (CIM). It is sometimes also used to include
total quality management (TQM) and just in time (ill) strategies (flarrison,
1990).
As the papers in this volume indicate, however, the payoff to AMT
depends on developing management structures and practices that take full
advantage of employee skills and abilities. Hayes and Jaikumar (1988) have
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argued that U.S. managers have too often "acquired new equipment much in the
way a family buys a new car. Drive out the old, drive in the new, enjoy the faster,
smoother, more economical ride--and go on with life as before. With the new
technology, however, 'as before' can mean disaster" (p. 77). A company cannot
"exploit the full potential of advanced equipment unless it organized to do so" (p.
83).
In the present paper, our focus is on the specific role that compensation
and related activities like performance appraisal play in the effective management
of human resources in AMT settings. As Gerhart and Milkovich (forthcoming)
have argued, compensation decisions are of key strategic importance, with some
empirical evidence suggesting that such decisions may have significant
consequences for organizations' financial performance (Gerhart & Milkovich,
1990). This is not surprising because compensation has at least two important
attributes. First, employee pay and benefits typically account for a substantial
portion of total operating costs. Although this share is ordinarily smaller in AMT
settings because of the automation of many labor-intensive activities, it is still
significant, and thus requires careful management. Second, beyond cost,
compensation decisions can have important consequences for key outcomes like
job satisfaction, attraction, retention, performance, flexibility, initiative,
commitment, cooperation, skill acquisition, individual performance, and, as
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indicated above, ultimately organization performance. Putting the cost
(investment) and behavioral/performance (return) aspects together makes it clear
that compensation can have an important influence on productivity and therefore,
the ability of an organization to compete in the global marketplace.
Prior to our discussion of the link between compensation and productivity,
it may be useful to provide an example of the magnitude of productivity
differences that can be found across organizations within a particular industry. A
comprehensive study of the automobile industry (Womack, Jones, & Roos, 1990)
is very helpful in this regard, particularly given the important role of automation
in this sector of the economy. Womack et al. note that the U.S. and Canadian
share of world motor vehicle production has fallen from over 70 percent in 1955
to approximately 25 percent in the late 1980s. The share of the U.S. domestic
motor vehicle market held by U.S. manufacturers has fallen from nearly 100
percent in 1955 to just over 60 percent by the late 1980s. What explains this
decline in the market share of U.S. companies?
Comparisons with Japanese producers shed some light on the issue.
Womack et al. (1990) report that the average Japanese plant requires fewer
assembly hours per vehicle (17 versus 25), one-third less physical space, and
carries a dramatically lower inventory (0.2 days versus 2.9 days). Moreover, the
Japanese plants demonstrate that such efficiency does not have to come at the
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expense of quality. In fact, their quality (e.g., defects per 100 vehicles) is 25
percent better than that of U.S. manufacturers (Womack et al., p. 92).2 Finally,
Japanese producers achieve all of this despite having lower labor costs
(Capdevielle, 1989).3
How is the average Japanese plant able to produce motor vehicles with
greater efficiency and quality, as well as lower labor costs? One explanation
revolves around automation. The average Japanese motor vehicle plant is more
heavily automated than its U.S. counterpart and Womack et al. (1990) show that
higher automation significantly reduces the number of assembly hours per vehicle
(r = -.67). Further, this high investment in automation has not come at the price
of reduced flexibility. As Adler (1988, p. 40) has noted, AMT strategies such as
flexible automation "undermine a deeply and widely felt intuition...that there is a
fundamental tension between innovation and efficiency." (see also Hayes &
Wheelwright, 1984).
However, consistent with the Hayes and Jaikumar (1988) argument,
Womack et al. (1990) also concluded that the Japanese advantage in automation
was only one (albeit an important) part of the story, explaining perhaps one-third
of total productivity differences between plants. As they put it, "automation and
manufacturability are important, but gaining the full potential of either requires
superior plant management" (p. 98). Womack et al.'s (1990) focus here is on
Compensation and AMT
6
"lean production," which has two key features: "It transfers the maximum number
of tasks and responsibilities to those workers actually adding value to the car on
the line, and it has in place a system for detecting defects that quickly traces every
problem, once discovered, to its ultimate cause" (p. 99).
Compensation and Human Resource Implications of AMT
What do AMT and lean production require of employees and employment
relations? According to Womack et al. (1990), it is the following: teamwork,
open communication and information-sharing, and skill breadth (e.g., to fill in for
each other and be able to quickly solve any problems that arise). Employees also
"need encouragement to think actively, indeed proactively, so they can devise
solutions before problems become too serious." Further, they argue that "workers
respond only when there exists some sense of reciprocal obligation, a sense that
management actually values skilled workers, will make sacrifices to retain them,
and is willing to delegate responsibility to the team" (p. 99). Again, comparisons
between Japanese and U.S. motor vehicle producers suggest significant differences
on these dimensions. The Japanese have a greater percentage of the work force
in teams (69 percent versus 17 percent), more suggestions per employee (62
versus 0.4), fewer job classes (12 versus 67), more training for new production
workers (380 hours versus 46 hours), and significantly greater use of job rotation
(3 versus 0.9 on a scale ranging from 0 = none to 4 = frequent). Employment
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stability is also significantly greater in both the automotive industry (Womack et
al.) and economy-wide (see Gerhart for a partial review).
Consistent with the above, a multi-industry study of practices in 24 AMT
settings (Walton & Susman, 1987) concluded that the following factors
characterize the AMT workplace: (a) greater interdependence among employees
and their activities, with smaller organizational units that make an entire product
or part; (b) different (often higher) skill requirements and fewer job
classifications; (c) increased cost of errors or malfunctions; (d) skill, knowledge
and mental effort are more important than physical effort; (e) more monitoring,
maintenance, and other long cycle activities that can make it easy for employees
to become inattentive, although it "requires workers to be alert and take
initiatives"; (f) continuous change and the need for adaptability and the ability to
learn; (g) higher investment per employee and leaner staffing levels; and (h) more
decentralized decision-making.
These consequences of AMT have implications for each of the basic areas
of compensation (e.g., Gerhart & Milkovich, forthcoming): structure, level,
individual differences (e.g., merit pay), and benefits. We examine each in turn
below (and also briefly touch on the topic of top management pay). As a general
point, we note that the influence of compensation practices on important
objectives can be very direct. Skill-based pay, for example, directly pays
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employees to acquire skills. Just as important, however, are the "indirect" effects
of compensation. For example, the compensation system can either facilitate or
constrain the success of other human resource management activities in areas
such as recruiting, selection, training, development, participative decision-making,
and team approaches. At times, in fact, a compensation program can be
particularly successful for what it does not do. Deming (1986), for example,
argues that most organizations do more harm than good when they reward
managers for achieving narrow (e.g., individual, departmental), numerical, short-
term goals. The implication is that removal of rewards for such behaviors would
benefit the organization.
We now turn to a discussion of the components of compensation, beginning
with pay structures.
Structure
Paying the Job
Pay structures are typically defined in terms of jobs. Tasks and
responsibilities for jobs are clearly specified in job descriptions. Jol? evaluation is
used to measure the worth of jobs to the organization and to allow comparisons
with jobs in other organizations .for the purpose of establishing market-based rates
of pay (Schwab, 1980).
However, Lawler (1990) has argued that job-based pay structures can be
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characterized by one or more of the following potential disadvantages. First,
paying the job instead of the individual may encourage a bureaucratic orientation
(see also Kanter, 1989). The job description sets out specific tasks and activities
for which the incumbent is responsible, and by implication, those for which the
incumbent is not responsible. Although this facilitates performance evaluation
and control by the manager, it can also encourage a lack of flexibility and a lack
of initiative on the part of employees as in "Why should I do that?--It's not in my
job description." Second, the hierarchical nature of this system entails mostly top-
down decision-making and information flow, as well as status differentials. This is
not consistent with the increasing emphasis on taking advantage of the skills and
knowledge of those closest to production or with reciprocal feedback and
information-sharing. Third, the bureaucracy required to generate and update job
descriptions and job evaluations can become a barrier to change because
wholesale changes to job descriptions can involve a tremendous amount of time
and cost. Fourth, the job-based. pay system may not reward desired behaviors,
particularly in a rapidly changing environment where the knowledge, skills, and
abilities needed yesterday may not be very helpful today and tomorrow. Lawler
suggests that promotion-seeking behavior is typically rewarded, which may not be
consistent with goals such as skill acquisition and continuous improvement that
are being increasingly embraced by AMT and other organizations.
compensation and AMT
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One response by some organizations has been to reduce the number of job
classifications and levels, sometimes dramatically. For example, General Electric
replaced its 29 pay grades with 5 grades. Pay grades 8 through 11, for instance,
were combined into one "band" ranging from $33,000 to $74,000 (Business Week,
December 10, 1990), giving GE considerably more flexibility in job assignments
and in assigning merit increases. In the automobile industry, Saturn, the new
division of General Motors, has only a few job classifications, in sharp contrast to
most other U.S. automobile manufacturers where the average is 67, but very
similar to Japanese manufacturers where the average is 12 (Womack et al., 1990).
One possible consequence, however, of a reduction in job classifications is a
reduced opportunity for promotion. Therefore, organizations need to consider
what they will offer employees instead. Continuous training, greater
responsibility, and pay tied to seniority or performance are some of the
approaches being used Q3usinessWeek, 1990). Finally, reducing job
classifications as a means of simply getting more work out of employees and
without decentralizing decision-making may not be a recipe for success (Keefe &
Katz, 1990).
Paying the Person: Pay for Skill and Knowledge
As another response to the drawbacks of job-based systems, some
organizations have turned to an alternative type of structure based on individual
Compensation and AMT
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characteristics such as skill or knowledge (Lawler, 1990; Ledford, 1991). The idea
is very simple. If you want employees to learn more skills and become more
flexible in the jobs they perform, pay them to do it. It is, however, "a fundamental
departure" because employees are now "paid for the skills they are capable of
using, not for the job they are performing at a particular point in time" (Ledford,
p. 199).
Conceptually, skill-based systems seem to fit well with the increased
breadth and depth of skill that many authors believe is necessary to maximize
AMT effectiveness (Adler, 1988; Cummings & Blumberg, 1987; Gupta, 1989;
Walton & Susman, 1987; Womack et al., 1990). For example, instead of being
limited to loading, monitoring, and unloading parts from a machine, operators
might be expected to take responsibility for maintenance and trouble-shooting,
reducing variance in the quality of materials, adjusting machines to within needed
tolerances, or modifying computer programs (Wall, Corbett, Martin, Clegg &
Jackson, 1990). Cummings and Blumberg (1987, p. 48, cited in Wall et al.)
recommended that production workers should be "given the necessary skills,
information and freedom to respond to unforseen circumstances." In similar
fashion, Toyota concluded years ago that "none of the specialists [e.g., quality
inspectors, many managers and foremen] beyond the assembly worker was actually
adding any value to the car. What's more...assembly workers could probably do
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most of the functions of specialists much better because of their direct
acquaintance with conditions on the line" (Womack et al., p. 56).
Thus, the key advantage of skill-based pay in an AMT environment is its
contribution to increased flexibility and the ability to decentralize decision-making
to those who are most knowledgeable. This flexibility can help in covering
employee turnover or absenteeism (Lawler, 1990), thus permitting leaner staffing
levels. In addition, multi-skilled employees are important in cases where different
products are manufactured requiring different processes, or where supply
shortages or other problems call for adaptive or flexible responses (Lawler)--
characteristics typical of many AMT environments (e.g., flexible manufacturing,
just-in-time systems). So, if there is an equipment failure or a need to shift
resources on short notice to a particular part of production, multi-skilled
employees should be better prepared. Lawler also observes that in addition to
the content of the particular skills acquired, skill-based plans may carry a more
general benefit in that they foster a climate of learning and adaptability. Finally,
employees with a broader view of the production process and organization should
be in a better position to participate in decision-making and make constructive
suggestions for continuous improvement.
On the other hand, skill-based approaches also have a number of potential
drawbacks (Gupta, Jenkins, & Curington, 1986; Lawler, 1990; Gerhart &
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Milkovich, 1991). First, such plans can become very costly as employees acquire
more skills that are not being utilized but must, nevertheless be compensated.
Thus, it is essential that the work process be structured so as to take full
advantage of this costly investment. Obviously, creating multi-skilled employees
who continue to work on one narrow job will not offer a good return on
investment. Second, as with job-based systems, "topping out" can be a problem if
employees reach a point where they have acquired all the skills and are therefore
not eligible for further pay increases. Third, to effectively administer the system,
a large bureaucracy may arise, ironically, very similar to that which occurs with
job-based systems. Training programs need to be developed. Skills (e.g., skill
blocks) must be described, measured, and assigned monetary values. Certification
tests of some sort must be constructed to determine whether an employee has in
fact acquired a certain skill. As Ledford (1991) points out, this can be a very
contentious process, and has no real counterpart in job-based systems. Finally, it
may be difficult to determine market rates under skill-based systems, partly
because relatively few companies are available for comparison.
Pay Level and Labor Cost
Initially, it will be helpful to think of pay level as cost per employee. As
discussed, skill level and breadth requirements often increase with the
introduction of AMT. For several (related) reasons, this may result in
1
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organizations choosing (or being pressured) to raise pay levels. Higher levels and
breadth of skill typically bring higher pay in the labor market (e.g., Campion &
Berger, 1990). Not surprisingly then, a substantial body of evidence indicates that
employees expect higher pay in return for increasing their skill level and breadth,
and without what they see as fair (higher) pay, they may strongly resist the
introduction of AMT technology (Cummings & Blumberg, 1987; Wall et al.,
1990). Some organizations act proactively by using skill-based pay programs,
which as discussed above, can also result in higher pay levels.
Second, employee movement can be very costly in an AMT environment.
As the organization's investment in its employees grows, so too does the cost of
employee movement. Therefore, a higher pay level policy may be chosen to
enhance retention and thus, the probability of realizing an adequate return on the
investment in training. Employee retention is also important in avoiding possible
disruptions in production while replacement employees are found. The large
investment in capital equipment in AMT settings can make such disruptions very
costly if it results in equipment being left idle.
Third, if as Walton and Susman (1987) suggest, the cost of errors increases
under AMT, a high quality workforce becomes more important. Consequently, a
high pay level may be chosen to achieve greater selectivity in hiring decisions.
A final factor relevant to pay level in AMT is the ratio of total labor costs
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to either total costs or revenues. These ratios are typically much lower under
AMT because of a combination of large investments in technology and low
staffing levels. The fact that labor costs are a smaller percentage of total costs
does not necessarily mean that pay level will be higher, but it may permit greater
flexibility on the part of the organization to choose a higher pay level.
Individual Differences in Pay
Pay structures include definitions of pay averages and ranges. Within
ranges, especially those that are job-based, individual differences in pay are often
determined through one or more "pay for performance" programs such as merit
pay, individual incentives, group incentives, gainsharing, profit-sharing, and
ownership.4 In describing specific programs, it may be useful to keep in mind a
classification scheme based on two dimensions (Milkovich & Wigdor, 1991): (a)
whether pay changes are rolled into the base (yes for merit pay, but not for most
others), and (b) the criterion (e.g., organization profits, group output, individual
performance appraisal) on which pay is based. The first dimension has
implications for the long-term accumulation of labor costs and the second
dimension has consequences for the types of behaviors encouraged (and by
implication, discouraged) under the compensation system.
Traditionally, individual differences in pay (and to some extent, pay
structures) have been viewed as most important in influencing the behaviors and
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attitudes of current employees, whereas pay level and benefits have been seen as
more critical to achieving attraction and retention objectives. However, as
Gerhart and Milkovich (forthcoming) have noted, this view leaves out the
potentially important influence of individual pay programs on the composition of
the workforce (see also Milkovich & Wigdor, 1991). It may be, for instance, that
high performers will be most attracted to organizations that have a strong pay for
(individual) performance relationship. For example, evidence indicates that such
organizations are more attractive among those that have a high need for
achievement (Bretz, Ash, & Dreher, 1989) or strongly value individual
achievement (Judge & Bretz, forthcoming). By the same logic, it is also possible
that people who prefer to work in teams may be more attracted to organizations
that link pay to team performance. If so, this reinforces the need to make sure
that compensation design is consistent with other human resource policies and
objectives.
As a final general observation, we suggest that the following pay programs
should not be viewed as competing alternatives in making design decisions.
Instead, because organizations have multiple, sometimes conflicting objectives,
multiple compensation programs are likely to be necessary (Majchrzak, 1988;
Lawler, 1990; Gerhart & Milkovich, forthcoming). So, profit-sharing might be
well-suited to helping control fixed labor costs and promoting a broad view, but at
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the same time, there are individual and group level objectives that may be
balanced through the simultaneous use of merit pay and team awards.
Merit Pay
Merit pay ties increases in base pay to individual performance. As a recent
report (Bretz, Milkovich, & Read, 1989) indicates, merit pay continues to be
widely used in U.S. companies. As such, we give it and related activities such as
performance appraisal considerable attention here.
The traditional approach to performance assessment is often described as
having the following features. First, there is a focus on identifying individual
differences in performance. These are assumed to reflect differences in ability or
motivation. By implication, system constraints on performance are not seen as
significant. Second, the majority of information on individual performance is
collected from the immediate supervisor. Peer and subordinate ratings are rare
and where they do exist they tend to receive less weight than supervisory ratings
(Bretz et aI., 1989). Third, there is a policy of linking pay increases to
performance appraisal results (Bretz et al.). Fourth, the feedback under such
systems tends to occur infrequently, often once per year at the formal
performance review session. Fifth, the flow of feedback tends to be largely
unidirectional, from supervisor to subordinate.
Despite its widespread use, merit pay as typically practiced is being
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increasingly questioned, especially in the context of AMT, where teams,
interdependence, flexibility, and decentralization are often key considerations.
Best known perhaps are several criticisms raised by Deming (1986). First, he
argues that it is unfair to rate individual performance because "apparent
differences between people arise almost entirely from the system that they work
in, not from the people themselves. A man not promoted is unable to understand
why his performance is lower than someone else's. No wonder; his rating was
the result of a lottery" (1986, p. 110). As examples of system factors, Deming
cites a person's co-workers, the job, materials, equipment, customers,
management, supervision, and environmental conditions. He argues that these
are, for the most part, outside of the worker's control, instead falling under
management's responsibility.
Second, Deming argues that merit pay discourages teamwork. As he puts
it, "Everyone propels himself forward, or tries to, for his own good, on his own life
preserver. The organization is the loser" (p. 102). As one example, he notes that
if people in the purchasing department are evaluated on something like the
number of contracts negotiated per man year, they may not take much interest in
improving the quality of materials because that might help people in
manufacturing, but not necessarily them (i.e., their pay). So, they do not seek
such improvement even though the organization suffers as a result. (See also
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Hayes & Jaikumar, 1988 on this point.)
Deming's suggested solution is to eliminate the link between individual
performance and pay. What is used instead? Schuler and Harris's (1991) case
study of a small electronic instrument manufacturer provides some insight. The
company has attempted to follow the Deming philosophy. It pays hourly workers
on the basis of seniority (not performance) and a profit-sharing plan. (It is not
clear whether seniority also determines promotions.) Performance appraisals are
used for developmental purposes and where necessary, to identify employees who
are "out of the system."5
Salaried employees are also on the profit-sharing plan, but in other
respects, the determination of their pay is "a little different" (Schuler & Harris,
1991, p. 201). This appears to be something of an understatement. They note
that "greater competition for skilled employees forces [the company] to adjust to
the market" (p. 201) and that significant adjustments take place "when the
employee and management become aware of an imbalance between the
employee's skills and the public market valuation of these skills" (p. 202).
This approach sounds very much like pay for performance to us and
illustrates the limitations of arguments that call for completely ignoring individual
differences in performance, especially in key jobs. As discussed earlier, high
performers may be more attracted to organizations that do pay for performance.
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Organizations that do not pay for individual performance face the risk of losing
higher performers (Gerhart, 1990). At some point, this disadvantage will negate
any advantage derived from an egalitarian approach to pay. Therefore, although
we agree with Deming that individual differences in performance may be given
too much emphasis in many cases, and certain steps can be taken to reduce this
emphasis (e.g., Scholtes, 1987), the answer is not to completely eliminate merit
pay. This would only replace one set of problems with another. Rather, as
discussed earlier, the goal is to design a mix of pay programs that will be effective
in accomplishing a mix of objectives.
Another issue concerns the heavy reliance on the supervisor as the source
of performance information and feedback. In a team environment, for example,
there may not be a supervisor or if there is, s/he may delegate many of the
traditional roles to the team. In such cases, peer ratings may be considered as an
alternative to supervisory ratings. What is the evidence on peer ratings?
On some dimensions, peer ratings have received high praise. For example,
McEvoy and Buller's (1987) analysis of the literature suggested tha~ peer ratings
are more stable than supervisory ratings and more likely to focus on task-relevant
abilities and competencies. Wexley and Klimoski (1984, cited in McEvoy &
Buller, p. 785), in fact, concluded that peer ratings were "potentially the most
accurate judgments of employee behavior" (p. 60). This may be due, in large part,
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to the ample opportunity that peers have to observe each other's performance.
Nevertheless, peer ratings are very rare in practice, with one study finding
that "less than 3% of the rating information used in the final appraisal decision
comes from [peer and other non-traditional] sources" (Bretz et aI., 1989, p. 9).
Why is there this discrepancy between research and practice?
The most common explanation in the academic literature is that employees
simply do not like peer ratings (see empirical findings by Cederblom &
Lounsbury, 1980; Downey, Medland, & Yates, 1976; Love, 1981) for a variety of
reasons (Smith, 1976; Kane & Lawler, 1978; DeNisi & Mitchell, 1978; see
McEvoy & Buller, 1987 for a summary), including: (a) managers' reluctance to
turn over evaluation power to others, (b) the belief that peer ratings are a
popularity contest, (c) reliance of peers on stereotypes, and (d) the possibility of
retaliation if one provides a peer with a low rating.
However, there are some potential problems with both the empirical
evidence and the logic employed in the peer ratings literature. Without exception,
the empirical literature has focused on the following question: How much do
employees like peer ratings in an absolute sense? As discussed, there is typically
a lack of enthusiasm. But, we would argue, the more relevant question concerns
how employees view peer ratings relative to supervisory ratings. This question has
not been asked, but evidence from other sources suggests that supervisory ratings
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are not terribly popular among either supervisors (Rice, 1985) or the employees
they rate.6 Thus, it may be a mistake to make too much of the lack of user
acceptance of peer ratings found in the literature. Moreover, McEvoy and Buller
(1987) argue that the low levels of user acceptance found in some previous studies
of peer ratings (e.g., Cederblom & Lounsbury, 1980) may be due, in large part, to
the fact that there was not confidentiality of raters.
Closer examination of the suggested drawbacks of peer ratings (see a--d
above) suggests similar doubts. In particular, problems b, c, and d are not unique
to peer ratings--they apply equally well to supervisory ratings. Again, the more
relevant (but unstudied) question is whether peer ratings are more susceptible to
such problems than are supervisory ratings.
There are, in fact, several reasons to believe that peer ratings can be
superior to supervisory ratings under certain conditions. Performance rating
accuracy can be thought of as a function of ability and motivation. Key factors on
the ability side are the opportunity to observe performance and knowledge of
what constitutes good performance. In a team setting, peers are likely to be
superior to supervisors on both counts. The motivation side is less
straightforward, with key considerations being the reward system and the degree
of decentralization of actual decision-making. For example, where pay is linked
to individual performance and is relative (e.g.t ranking), the motivation to rate
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accurately may not be high. On the other hand, in cases where pay is based on
team performance and the team has the formal authority to take remedial (or
even disciplinary) action, motivation to rate accurately can be quite high.
Whatever the source of performance rating information, acceptance of the
process is likely to be greater if employees believe it is procedurally fair. This
may be more likely in cases where employees (a) believe feedback is well-
grounded in evidence, (b) feel that consistent performance standards are used,
and (c) have an opportunity to provide input prior to a recommendation (Folger
& Konovsky, 1989).
Individual Incentives
Like merit pay, individual incentives reward individual performance. But,
in this case, payments are not rolled into the base and the performance measure
is usually some type of physical output rather than a subjective assessment.
Individual incentives have the potential to significantly impact performance, but
are relatively rare for a variety of reasons (Gerhart & Milkovich, forthcoming).
First, they simply are not feasible for many jobs because there is no physical
output measure. Second, there are a host of potential administrative problems
(e.g., in setting and maintaining acceptable standards) that often prove to be
intractable. Third, individual incentives may do too good of a job of motivating
employees in the following sense--they do whatever they get paid for and nothing
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else.
Individual incentives can be particularly ill-suited to many AMT
environments. For instance, individual incentives typically do not fit well with the
team approach. The payment system does not encourage cooperation or any sort
of organizational citizenship behavior, which has been defined as discretionary
behaviors "that are not part of employees' formal role requirements, but
nevertheless promote the effective functioning of the organization" (Organ, 1988,
p. 4). Individual incentives may also be inconsistent with multi-skilling and
proactive problem-solving. Learning new skills can entail a large opportunity cost
because of lost income. In addition, income can be maximized by specializing in
one task (e.g., a particular machine). Proactive problem-solving is likely to have a
very narrow focus, limited to maximizing output (and thus income) on a particular
task. Therefore, although individual incentives carry potential advantages, these
are not likely to include contributing to a flexible, proactive, problem-solving
workforce.
Finally, in cases where individual incentives have been in place for some
time, they may be particularly difficult to remove. If, as suggested above,
different compensation systems attract different types of employees, it may be the
case that individual incentives attract the most individualistic employees. An easy
transition to cooperation and teamwork may be especially difficult in this case.
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Somewhat related, as suggested in the case of merit pay, high performers earning
high pay may be more prone to question what they stand to gain from a more
egalitarian approach to pay.
Profit-sharing and Employee Ownership
At the other end of the continuum from individual plans are profit-sharing
and stock ownership plans. Under profit-sharing, payments are based on an
organization level performance measure (profits) and the payments do not
become part of the base salary. Profit-sharing has two potential advantages.
First, it may encourage employees to think more like owners, taking a broad view
of what needs to be done to make the organization more effective. Thus, the sort
of narrow self-interest encouraged by individual incentive plans (and perhaps also
by merit pay) would presumably be less of an issue. Rather, greater levels of
cooperation and citizenship behaviors would be expected. Second, because
payments do not become part of base pay, it automatically reduces labor costs
during difficult economic times and shares the wealth during good times. As one
consequence, organizations may not need to rely on layoffs as much to reduce
costs during tough times (Weitzman, 1984).
Although there is some evidence that employment stability is greater under
profit-sharing (Chelius & Smith, 1990; Gerhart, 1990; Kruse, 1991), the evidence
on performance effects is less clear. Weitzman and Kruse (1990) conclude that
l,1
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profit-sharing does increase organization performance, but Gerhart and Milkovich
(forthcoming) question the nature of much of this evidence. Conceptually,
Deming's point about the relative influence of the individual versus the system
comes to mind here. It is not clear that any single employee (except for top
executives and other key employees) is likely to see much of a link between
his/her performance and profits, because the latter are influenced by so many
factors beyond his/her control and outside the scope of the job. Consequently,
profit-sharing may not only fail to increase performance motivation, but
employees may also view as unfair the fact that they are expected to earn less
money during business downturns if they feel that are not to blame? In addition,
at lower pay levels, income reductions due to low profits can be very painful.
Therefore, although profit-sharing may be useful as one component of a
compensation system (e.g., to enhance identification with broad organizational
goals), it may need to be complemented with other pay programs that more
closely link pay to outcomes that individuals or teams can control (or "own").
Employee ownership vehicles such as stock options are similar to profit-
sharing in that employees are encouraged to identify with broad organization
goals. As owners, this identification may be stronger. In addition, under
employee stock ownership plans (ESOPs), employees must be permitted to vote
their securities if they are registered on a national exchange (Conte & Svejnar,
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1990). In this sense, participation in decision-making may be given a boost.
Finally, ESOPs can carry important tax and financing advantages and are
sometimes used as a takeover defense (under the assumption that employee
owners will be "friendly" to management). Given the similarity with profit-sharing,
stock ownership also has the same potential disadvantages--a questionable impact
on individual motivation and significant income risk.
Gainsharing. Group Incentives and Team Awards
These plans are similar in that they (a) do not roll payments into the base,
and (b) they attempt to blend the advantages of individual and organizational
level pay plans. As Milkovich and Wigdor (1991) have suggested, these plans
"may provide a way to accommodate the complexity and interdependence of jobs,
the need for work group cooperation, and the existence of work group
performance norms and still offer the motivational potential of clear goals, clear
pay-to-performance links, and relatively large pay increases" (p. 86).
One way to distinguish the plans is in terms of coverage breadth.
Gainsharing plans may encompass an entire business unit (e.g., division,
department, plant), whereas group incentives and team awards would typically
cover one of the groups or teams within the business unit (Welbourne & Gomez-
Mejia, 1991). Perhaps the main distinction between group incentives and team
awards is that the former typically refers to plans where performance is measured
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as physical output, whereas team awards can be tied to a variety of performance
measures (e.g., cost savings, successful completion of product design, meeting
deadlines; see Welbourne & Gomez-Mejia). Gainsharing plans can also include
a similar variety of performance measures.
The similarity of group incentive plans to individual incentive plans
suggests some of the same potential drawbacks such as narrowness of focus, as
well as lack of cooperation (in this case, between groups rather than individuals).
Team awards also raise the question of how inter-team relationships can be
effectively handled (Welbourne & Gomez-Mejia, 1991).
Because of its wider coverage, gainsharing may offer something of a
solution, to competition between groups or teams. This can be a particularly
important consideration, especially in AMT environments, where coordination and
cooperation between groups and individuals in different functions and
departments is often critical. Like team awards, gainsharing plans can make use
of a wide variety of performance measures, including productivity ratios such as
labor cost/sales, actual hours/standard hours, or even return on investment at the
plant level if the accounting system permits.
Gainsharing plans are often confused with profit-sharing plans, but there
are important differences. In contrast to profit-sharing, (a) payment is based on a
measure of productivity (often plant level), not profits (usually organization level);
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(b) payments are distributed more frequently (e.g., monthly or quarterly); and (c)
closely related, the payments are not deferred. (They are under most profit-
sharing plans.)
More generally, in practice, gainsharing plans often include non-pay
components such as periodic meetings, problem-solving teams, newsletters,
steering committees, and suggestion systems (Conference Board, 1990). As
several authors (Hammer, 1988; Milkovich & Wigdor, 1991; Mitchell, Lewin, &
Lawler, 1991) have noted, these non-pay aspects may well explain some of the
success associated with gainsharing plans. In one study, for example, goal-setting
and feedback interventions appeared to be much more important than monetary
group incentives in generating performance improvements (Pritchard, Jones, Roth,
Stuebing, & Ekenberg, 1988). However, Pritchard et al. suggested that the
monetary incentives may have been important in sustaining such performance
improvements over the longer run. In addition, evidence from other studies
indicates that compensation can have a significant independent effect on
performance (Schuster, 1990), as illustrated, for example, by the positive
experiences with Improshare (Fein, 1981) and other pay-oriented plans (Wagner,
Rubin, & Callahan, 1988; Kaufman, 1992).
Ross and Ross (1991) argue that the following contextual factors are
conducive to the success of gainsharing programs: (a) management commitment,
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(b) either a need to change or a strong commitment to continuous improvement,
(c) management acceptance and encouragement of employee input, (d) high levels
of cooperation and interaction, (e) employment security, (f) information sharing
on productivity and costs, (g) goal setting, (h) commitment of all involved parties
to the process of change and improvement, and (i) agreement on a performance
standard and calculation that is understandable, seen as fair, and closely related to
managerial objectives.
Finally, one administrative challenge that can arise with any of these three
plans concerns the question of "Who's on the team (or in the group)?'s A project
development team, for example, might include people from marketing, research,
engineering, and so forth. How long is each individual involved in the project and
how much time does each allocate while involved? Each persons may be on
multiple "teams" at any point in time, which may be difficult to define because
they are fluid. The result can be a significant administrative challenge.
Benefits
Several features of AMT have important consequences for the design of
benefits. First, given the large capital investment in automation, production
down-time is expensive and needs to be minimized. Variation in production can
also cause difficulties under many circumstances, such as under a just-in-time
system. Underutilization of equipment can stem from several sources, including
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breakdowns, tool availability, set-up time, rejected products, and lack of operator
availability (Lenz, 1989). Benefits programs can have a significant influence on
the latter through their influence on both employee attendance and retention
(Gerhart & Milkovich, forthcoming). Thus, basic decisions about sick leave
policies (amount paid, disciplinary actions for excessive sick leave) take on added
importance because of the increased concern with avoiding staffing problems.
Second, as discussed earlier, AMT often entails higher skill requirements
(Walton & Susman, 1987). Much as with its investment in physical capital, the
organization needs to maximize the return on its investment in employees' human
capital (Hayes & Jaikumar, 1988). Therefore, employee retention takes on added
importance. In addition to pay level decisions, benefits programs such as pensions
and medical insurance need to be designed with this in mind to reduce voluntary
quits. More broadly, benefits such as family leave and wellness programs can also
be viewed as playing an important role in making sure that human capital is
retained (and maintained in good condition).
Third, the organization must create a climate of trust and mutual
obligation if it expects employees to accept new technology, learn new skills, and
be more proactive. A common theme is that employment security may be
necessary to achieve this objective (Walton & Susman, 1987; Womack et aI., 1990;
Majchrzak, 1988; Hayes & Jaikumar, 1988). As Schuler and Harris (1991) note,
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although such a practice "strikes many as out-dated and impractical...companies
interested in quality are rethinking this...[because] they recognize that repeated
downsizing to reduce costs destroys credibility in HR practices that claim to view
employees as important" (p. 196). They also point out that the Malcom Baldridge
Award places significant weight on employment security.
Top Management Pay
Top managers have great potential to influence organizational success.
Consequently, their pay may warrant some additional discussion. One might
argue that a long-term perspective in decision-making takes on added importance
in an AMT environment. Automation typically entails a large investment with
returns often not realized until several years down the road. Unfortunately, U.S.
managers are often described as having a short-run orientation (Hayes &
Abernathy, 1980), with a significant amount of the blame being attributed to the
design of their compensation (e.g., linking bonuses to short-term, for example,
quarterly financial performance; e.g., Rappaport, 1978). Deming's (1986) criticism
of the use of numerical goals is in the same general vein. As with ~ndividual
incentive systems, precise, difficult goals can often be achieved quite successfully.
One problem, however, is that trade-offs may be made with other important (but
not as clearly specified) goals, such as quality and cooperation.
To encourage long-term (and sometimes risky) investments, greater
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emphasis on vehicles such as restricted stock, stock options, and so forth can be
considered. Some evidence, for example, suggests that their usage is linked to
increased capital investment (Larcker, 1983). In addition, research suggests that
an emphasis on long-term goals in executive compensation packages can decrease
year-to-year fluctuations in employment levels (Gerhart, 1991), which may be
desired to preserve investments in human capital and to show employees that
there is a sense of mutual obligation.
Finally, we should note the continued attention in the popular press to the
level of top management pay in the U.S. and how it compares with pay in other
countries (e.g., Business Week, 1992). In 1989, Towers, Perrin, Forster, and
Crosby (TPF&C) reported that the average total remuneration (base, bonus, long
term incentives, benefits, perquisites) of U.S. chief executive and chief financial
officers in companies with at least $250 million in annual sales was $543,000. By
comparison, the average was $352,000 in Japan, $287,000 in the former West
Germany, and $130,000 in South Korea (CompFlash, 1990).9 In addition, the
ratio of chief executive pay to that of hourly production workers was 35 to 1 in
the U.S., compared with 15 to 1 in Japan and 20 to 1 in Europe Qn.9ustryWeek,
1990).
There is no consensus on what these numbers tell us (Gerhart &
Milkovich, forthcoming). On one side, it can be argued that such pay levels are
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needed to attract and retain top executive talent. The pool of such people is
small and competition for them is great. On the other hand, the ratio of
executive pay to production worker pay has been spoken of as contributing to a
"trust gap," described as a situation where employees distrust and resent top
management (fortune, 1989). In any case, if a goal in AMT settings is to reduce
status differentials, encourage trust, and develop a team orientation among
employees, the design of top management pay is likely receive a good deal of
scrutiny from employees who want to see if management is doing its part.
Conclusion
A recurring theme is that no single pay program is capable of achieving the
entire set of complex objectives faced in AMT (and other) environments. Thus,
in establishing individual differences in pay, some combination of plans (e.g.,
merit pay, team awards, and profit-sharing) may be chosen to balance multiple
and sometimes conflicting objectives. Moreover, the success of decisions in any
one major area may be significantly influenced by decisions in others. Welboume
and Gomez-Mejia (1991), for example, discuss the potential futility of using team
awards to encourage cooperation among individuals, while at the same time
having a hierarchical pay structure that encourages individuals to compete for
promotion opportunities.
In general, the attributes of AMT settings will often call for a significantly
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different approach to the management and utilization of human resources.
Compensation is typically a very important influence on the attitudes and
behaviors of employees, whether they be in the executive suite or on the
production floor (Gerhart & Milkovich, forthcoming). Consequently, it is
important to continually evaluate what attitudes and behaviors are being
encouraged (or implicitly discouraged) by tbe compensation system. Teamwork,
innovation, proactive involvement, and other human resource objectives that are
especially important in an AMT environment, will otherwise be elusive.
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Footnotes
1.0n a brighter note, U.S. productivity growth was more competitive during the late
2.Deming's work also questions the widespread belief that there is a trade-off
between quantity and quality, suggesting that they are positively related (as in the
automotive data example in the text).
3.Fluctuations in currency exchange rates make such comparisons difficult. However,
over the years, hourly compensation costs (including benefits) have been lower in
Japan.
4.In some cases, rate ranges are not used. Instead all employees in a particular job
are paid a single rate. In other cases, a range may exist, but pay increases are based
on seniority. These provisions are most common in the union sector (Freeman &
Medoff, 1984).
5.A typical rule of thumb is three or more standard deviations from the average.
6.Unions, for example, have typically opposed using supervisory ratings as a basis for
pay. "Because the value of a worker's contribution to a firm is extremely difficult to
measure and different supervisors may read the same facts in different ways, the
union will seek to protect the membership from the uncertainty of arbitrary
supervisory decisions by pressing for a one rate-per-job pay policy" (p. 80). Note the
similarity between this view and Deming's (1986) criticisms of merit pay.
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7.The much publicized profit-sharing plan for the Dupont Fibers division (Santora,
1991) was eliminated when division profits were down and employees were about to
actually experience "downside risk." Saturn has also recently scaled back its reliance
on profit-sharing because of lower than expected profits.
8.Thanks to Robert Mulkey for sharing his experiences with this issue.
9.TPF&C reports that spending power differences further widen the U.S. lead in pay.
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